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equal pay. We also find that employed women are less (not more) satisfied
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findings suggest that norms regarding the appropriate relative pay of women
compared to men are shaping gender differences in well-being.
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The generality of the male sex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with
an equal.
John Stuart Mill (1869)
1 Introduction
It is a well-established statistical finding that women earn less than men on
the labor market.1 Nevertheless, women do not report significantly lower
satisfaction with their life or their job and, in countries like the USA, Great
Britain, or Switzerland, they even report higher job satisfaction than men.2
This is a puzzle. To the extent that the gender wage gap is thought to be
due to discrimination that is perceived as such, one would expect women to
experience lower well-being than men, ceteris paribus.
This paper explores whether norms regarding appropriate pay of women
compared to men can account for gender differences in salaries and subjective
well-being and thus solve the puzzle mentioned above. We do not want to
offer a comprehensive theory, but we rather argue that social norms are
one factor that has been understudied. In our framework, social norms are
internalized and are thus indicative of individual preferences. We follow the
argument that there are strong norms handed down from one generation to
another that appropriate salaries for men are higher than for women. They are
rooted in traditional values favoring gender-specific specialization, giving men
priority on the labor market and women priority in the household. Intuitively,
the view of men’s priority on the labor market leads to higher reference
wages of men compared to women. We think of the reference wage as a
cognitively relevant standard that affects how people evaluate their income.
This reference wage, first, can be understood to affect actual wages because
reference pay is important in wage bargaining, where one’s reference standard
determines the initial offer, as well as the effort invested in negotiating a higher
salary. Second, reference standards mediate the effect of actual salaries on
individual well-being. As long as both, women and men, get what they expect
or ask for, differences in absolute salaries may not result in differences in
reported subjective well-being.3 However, if our empirical approach captures
discrimination, women are expected to report lower subjective well-being in
regions with, on average, a larger gender wage gap.
We investigate the extent to which shared norms regarding equal rights are
relevant on the labor market by studying a national referendum on an equal
rights amendment to the Swiss constitution in 1981. A central proposition of
1See, e.g., Blau and Kahn (2000), Stanley and Jarrell (1998), and Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer (2005).
2See, e.g., Clark (1997) and Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000).
3Crosby (1982) calls the same phenomenon the “paradox of the contented female worker” and
refers to relative deprivation theory to explain it. Related research is, e.g., discussed in Phelan
(1994).
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the equal rights amendment was that “women and men shall have the right to
equal pay for work of equal value.” This referendum thus provides a measure
of the degree to which voters believe that the appropriate pay for a woman is
equal to that of a man. This proxy measure enables us to identify communities
where people challenge the traditional role model and where women demand
equality.
We find that there is a smaller gender wage gap for workers in communities
where people strongly approved the constitutional amendment on equal rights
(liberal communities) than in traditional communities. This finding is consis-
tent with the first implication of a norms-based explanation derived from the
notion that women in liberal communities have higher reference standards of
what is an appropriate salary than women in more traditional communities.
In order to study the second implication of a norms-based explanation of
the gender wage gap, the subjective well-being of women compared to men
is analyzed. If the large gender wage gap in traditional communities is due to
internalized norms, women in these communities are not expected to report
lower subjective well-being than in liberal communities. However, if it is due
to discrimination that is perceived as such, the life satisfaction of employed
women is expected to be lower in traditional communities compared to liberal
ones. Our findings for working women and men indicate that women are not
less (but even more) satisfied with their life in traditional compared to liberal
communities (while there are no significant differences for men across com-
munities). This finding is again consistent with a framework that incorporates
social norms. Furthermore, perceived discrimination of women compared to
men is higher (not lower) in liberal than in traditional communities.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the societal approval of equal
rights plays a significant role in the labor market success of women compared
to men. In interpreting our findings, the possibility of omitted variable biases
has, however, to be kept in mind. We therefore study a range of alternative
explanations and differential predictions.
This paper does not discuss how the specific social work norms developed.
Norms can evolve to justify current practice if, e.g., past discrimination influ-
ences current expectations. Social norms may then reflect imbedded effects
of past gender discrimination which has been internalized by both women
and men. Even though social work norms are seen as part of individuals’
preferences and thus relevant for experienced utility, some people might want
to override them based on meta preferences for equality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
the nature of gender differences in salary entitlements and its consequences
for wage bargaining and labor market outcomes. Section 3 proposes a new
measure to capture spatial differences in people’s beliefs about women’s role
on the labor market. The empirical relevance of shared beliefs about women
having equal rights on the labor market is studied in Sections 4 and 5. We
analyze a set of important labor market outcomes as well as four survey
measures on reported subjective well-being and perceptions of discrimination.
Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
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2 Norms on the appropriate pay for women and men
2.1 Why are there gender-specific norms regarding appropriate pay?
Salaries are a useful starting point for considering gender differences in labor
market success. When market forces determine salaries so that they come
close to marginal factor productivity, there is no room for norms on gender-
specific appropriate pay. However, the importance of bargaining in wage
determination indicates that there is scope for other factors in addition to
productivity in determining salaries. While economic thinking has emphasized
the role of the outside option in bargaining outcomes, there is ample evidence
that social norms and fairness considerations also play an important role in
wage setting (e.g., Bewley 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000).
This paper argues that a particular social pay norm—the belief that women
ought to earn as much as men for work of equal value—may affect the
outcome of wage bargaining. This gender-specific norm has developed over
time. Historically, gender-specific specialization has given men priority on
the labor market and women in the household. Men were expected to keep
a family, and thus, their appropriate salaries were higher than what they
“needed” just for themselves. In contrast, female workers were not expected
to keep a family and therefore “needed” less. The early literature in economics
noted that
It is notorious that women get lower wages than men because women can
live on less, or need less, or are helped out by home supplementation,
or have their theatre tickets furnished them by their escorts (Davenport
1919).
Gender-specific specialization was associated with strong gender-specific
socialization and occupational segregation. While females were taught to
behave in a cooperative, selfless, and nurturing way, males were taught to
behave in a competitive and selfish way. These processes led to both sexes
having systematically different expectations about what salary is appropriate
for women’s and men’s work. This view is very succinctly expressed by a
cotton-spinning mill owner:
[i]f men had from any cause to be employed in the work which women
now do, they would undoubtedly get higher wages, though they might
not do more or better work; the standard of their wages is higher (cited
in Webb 1891, p. 641).
The double standards in appropriate earnings were explicitly studied among
200 white adults in Baltimore (Jasso and Webster 1997). Based on the vignette
technique, they find that women as well as men considered appropriate
earnings to be lower for women than for men (with similar age and same
education and occupation). The female/male ratio in the “fair” gender wage
gap is estimated at 0.85 for men and 0.88 for women. These results are due
to a lower base level of the fair salaries as well as lower returns to schooling
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for women than for men. Complementary evidence is from survey studies
with small samples drawn from the college student population. In one study
(Major et al. 1984), 76 undergraduates had to determine what they thought
would be a fair compensation for a fixed amount of work. The young women
in the sample paid themselves less money than the young men did. In a second
study by the same authors, 40 women and 40 men received a payment first
and were then asked to do as much work as they thought appropriate for the
amount they had received. Women worked longer, made fewer mistakes, and
had a higher output. Differences in pay standards were also found for 126
people who determined either their own salary or the salary of another person.
Women paid themselves less than men did and even less than what they paid
other women (Callahan-Levy and Messe 1979). In another study (Bylsma and
Major 1992), 203 undergraduates indicated how much they deserved to be
paid in nine different employment scenarios. The earnings women felt that
they deserved were lower than men’s earnings. It is also found that women’s
ratings of their performance and their pay satisfaction are more influenced by
comparing themselves with other women than with men (Bylsma and Major
1994).
Arguably, norms about appropriate pay are likely to change only slowly
over time. Individual pay negotiations are typically based on limited knowl-
edge of other workers’ pay. The tendency to interact more frequently with
coworkers of the same gender implies that information about male coworkers’
pay has a limited impact on the wage negotiated by a woman. Moreover,
information about gender differences in pay in liberal regions is unlikely to
affect conservative regions due to limited mobility of workers. In our analysis,
this suggests that norms about women’s and men’s separate roles on the labor
market and about appropriate salaries prevailing in 1981 still hold today to
some extent and imply gender-specific differences in compensation.
However, there are women who do not share the norms anymore and some
of them have been active in the women’s movement, have engaged in the
introduction of equal rights legislation, advanced pay transparency, or have
stood up for institutions that make job and family life compatible. There is also
a rethinking occurring in the minds of men and some giving up of traditional
roles and norms. Thus, the extent to which the traditional norms are shared
varies substantially between people, but also between countries, regions, and
even small neighboring communities.
2.2 What are the consequences of gender-specific appropriate pay norms?
To the extent that women as well as men think that women deserve lower pay,
women can be expected to negotiate in a systematically different way than men
do. In fact, there is now substantial evidence that women ask for less than men,
or do not ask at all in pay negotiations (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Riley and
McGinn 2002; Säve-Söderbergh 2006; see also Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999
for a meta-analysis on gender differences in negotiation outcomes). Babcock
and Laschever, for example, report from a survey in the USA that 20% of
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women said they never negotiated. For most women, the most recent pay
negotiation goes twice as far back as for most men. Women’s reluctance to
negotiate is reinforced by other parties in the bargaining process. Women
who ask for more or promote themselves often suffer social reprisals because
they violate the gender prescription of being modest (e.g., Wade 2001). These
gender-specific beliefs about appropriate behavior and payoffs are also found
in laboratory experiments with stylized bargaining situations. In ultimatum
games, it is found that both women and men offer less to women, and both
women and men choose higher minimum acceptable offers when the proposer
is a woman (Solnick 2001).
A straightforward prediction of women making lower initial offers in salary
negotiations and negotiating less often is that they earn less than men for
equal work.4 There is a substantial literature in labor economics studying
gender differences in wages. A key difficulty in this research, however, is
the identification of the causal mechanisms leading women to earn less than
men for seemingly equal work (Altonji and Blank 1999). Many findings that
are usually regarded as discrimination by employers, fellow male employees,
and customers, or as statistical discrimination, can be well understood in a
framework of norms about gender-specific appropriate salaries. Examples are
findings about the gender wage gap under collective bargaining (e.g., Blau and
Kahn 2003). In particular, as the position of female employees’ in collective
salary negotiations is strengthened, lower gender differences compared to in-
dividual bargaining might indicate that gender specific appropriate salaries are
partly overcome. Another set of findings is about the effect of product market
competition on the gender wage gap. In a study about the US banking sector,
e.g., liberalization is argued to have reduced the possibilities for employer
discrimination (Black and Strahan 2001). An alternative interpretation is that
as the pot of money to be distributed among employees became smaller, it was
no longer possible to satisfy men’s relatively higher aspirations in negotiations
about their compensation. However, the strength of social norms about gender
differences in appropriate salaries has, as far as we are aware, never been
measured explicitly in order to be able to test such alternative explanations
more closely.
3 Measuring norms regarding appropriate pay
We propose measuring the norm that women’s appropriate salaries are not
different than men’s using the voting outcome on an amendment to the
Swiss constitution. In January 1975, the fourth national congress of women in
Switzerland decided to launch a popular initiative postulating equal rights for
4Norms about women’s and men’s role on the labor market do not only affect the outcomes of
salary negotiations but also decisions about promotion (for related work on glass ceiling, see, e.g.,
Albrecht et al. 2003) and advanced training or shared expectations about appropriate effort on
the job.
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women and men. Up until then, article 4 of the Swiss constitution held that “all
human beings are equal before the law”. Skeptics suggested that legal practice
only ensured that all women were equal and all men were equal, but no
woman was a man’s equal in the eyes of the law. Note that Switzerland is quite
conservative regarding women’s rights. For instance, the Swiss government did
not ratify Charter 100 of the ILO, demanding equal rights for women and men,
until 1972.
The initiative proposed amending the constitution by an article that listed in
detail the specific areas and the respective rights that should be made law. In
December 1975, the committee launching the popular initiative had collected
the number of signatures required to force the Swiss government to schedule
the initiative. The parliament decided to work out a counter proposal reading
as follows:
Men and women have equal rights. Legislation shall ensure legal equality,
particularly in the areas of family, education and work. Men and women
shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value.
The committee who launched the initiative decided to withdraw the original
version of the amendment.
The constitutional amendment covers three important areas: Equality
within the family was an essential ingredient to the cause of Swiss women
because the prevailing family law stipulated the husband as being the head
of the family and being the sole actor to represent the family outside. Equality
in education was deemed an important cause because school curricula were
reflecting the old view that girls should be taught the skills of running a house-
hold, as opposed to boys who should be able to support the household. Thus,
from secondary school onwards, girls tended to be taught how to knit and cook,
whereas boys perfected their skills in mathematics. The area of market work
formed an essential pillar of the constitutional amendment because women
earned, on average, 30% less than men according to newspaper articles of that
time. It is noteworthy that in contrast to the general norms stipulated with
respect to family and education, the amendment contains the explicit directive
that women must earn the same money for work of equal value. Thus, this
third requirement was to improve the legal situation of women immediately
after the vote had been cast.5
The public debate in the newspapers focused mainly on two issues. “Will
a ‘yes’ to this amendment mean the end of the family?”6 and “Equal work—
5It was understood at the time that primarily, the private sector would be affected by this vote.
The public sector had been covered by the ILO equal rights agreement no. 100 that the Swiss
government had ratified in 1972 and by a federal law passed in 1977. The amendment did not
directly invalidate all contracts between employers and workers that stipulated different pay for
equal work. Instead, each contract had to be reviewed separately by the court in order to determine
violation of the constitution (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 30, 1981).
6Headline of an article in the newspaper Blick, June 3, 1981.
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but the wage is different.”7 The issue of the implications for the family has
to be seen against the backdrop of the 1968 revolution. Conservative thinkers
argued that this amendment might be used to create the legal framework that
would destroy the “main pillar of society.” The second issue of unequal pay
was addressed in several ways. First, some newspapers focused on minimum
wages in identical occupations. For instance, it was found that the minimum
wage for a male sales clerk was 1,900 CHF/month, whereas a female sales
clerk earned only 1,640 CHF/month. Second, a dissertation at the University
of Berne investigating unequal pay between women and men got a lot of press
coverage (Reis 1988). Relying on unusually rich data regarding work input, this
dissertation found that women did indeed earn less than men, that the expected
job duration of women was shorter, representation of women in unions was
lower, and that discrimination might contribute to this differential pay for
equal work. This shows that voters were indeed confronted with the issue that
women were earning less than men.
On June 14, 1981, Swiss voters had to decide whether they would like to
amend the Swiss constitution to reflect not only equality of human beings in
general but equality of women and men in particular. A total of 707,702 voters
(or 60.2% of the electorate) and 17 cantons voted in favor of the amendment,
while 525,885 voters and nine cantons opposed the amendment—the initiative
proved to be successful.8 In the exit poll, the main reasons in favor of the
amendment were “equal pay for work of equal value,” “equal rights,” and
“women are worth as much as men” reported by roughly 70% of the voters
interviewed. The remaining 30% of voters argued in favor of the amendment
because it brought advanced gender equality in the family and in education.
This shows that the vote indeed reflects the extent to which voters agree with
the norm that women should earn what men do if they do the same work.9
Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of approval of equal rights
across 2,896 Swiss communities, with lighter shading reflecting a higher propor-
tion of people approving of equal rights. On the one hand, the western and the
southeastern parts of Switzerland, as well as the area around Zurich, tended to
favor the constitutional amendment strongly. On the other hand, a dark belt
of communities stretching from the southwest to the northeast of Switzerland
expressed their disapproval of the amendment. There is a surprising number
of communities in which not only men but also a significant proportion of
women must have rejected the amendment. This suggests that not only one’s
own material well-being (instrumental voting) but rather the shared beliefs
7Headline of an article in the newspaper Luzerner Neuste Nachrichten, June 4, 1981.
8A constitutional amendment has to be accepted by both the majority of people and the majority
of cantons.
9In reaction to the vote, the Swiss employer’s association printed a booklet to be distributed to its
members containing, among other things, the reasons for unequal pay between women and men.
“There is scientific proof that women are 30% [note that this figure coincides exactly with the
gender wage differential at that time] less productive than men. This finding is based on studies
that study the oxygen intake capacity of male and female subjects.”
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Notes: Lighter shading indicates a higher percentage of voters in favor of adding an equal rights amendment to the Swiss constitution in 1981.
Results are across 2896 communities. 
Source: Statistics Switzerland, map produced with mapresso. 
Fig. 1 Approval of the constitutional amendment on equal rights in Switzerland, 1981
about the appropriate pay and position of women were important in the voting
decision (expressive voting).10
In the empirical analysis below, we take the voting result to measure the
extent to which people share the view that women should have the same rights
in all areas of life and the same entitlements on the labor market as men.11
We rely on the vote as a proxy that captures the views of voters in 1981,
which we then merge with information on labor market and subjective well-
being outcomes at the end of the twentieth century. This means that we can
investigate both a direct channel that runs from individual values and norms
to well-being (for the older cohorts) as well as an indirect inter-generational
10It would, of course, also be possible to develop an argument why women who voted “no”
followed their material self-interest (instrumental voting). Intra-household bargaining theory,
e.g., suggests that a woman not working in the labor market is more concerned with the impact
of the referendum on her husband’s salary than her own potential salary in the future. To the
extent that the amendment leads to overall wage pressure, she would find it in her material self-
interest to vote against equal pay. However, the motives for approval or disapproval stated in
the survey conducted immediately after the vote do not align with considerations following from
intra-household bargaining theory.
11Note that it is not possible to rely on different votes to find an equally convincing proxy for
the social pay norm. Possible candidates for different votes include the national referendums on
extending suffrage to women held in 1959 (rejection) and 1971 (approval). These referendums
capture more generally than the present popular initiative the notion of political equality between
men and women. As an attractive alternative, surveys tend to focus more directly on values.
However, it is usually not possible to rely on them to measure the norms that prevail within
communities, as there are not a sufficient number of observations for any communities other than
a few big cities.
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channel, whereby we study the role of the parents’ views for the children’s
outcomes (for the younger cohorts). Of course, merging past information on
norms with current information on outcomes implies measurement error and
leads to lower bound estimates. However, it is likely that individuals, who
were liberally minded 20 years ago, still tend to live in liberal communities.
Moreover, choosing to live in communities where people share similar norms
facilitates the analysis rather than hampers it.12
For a social work norm to be relevant in wage determination today, it is,
of course, necessary that gender differences with respect to appropriate pay
still exist. Based on the vignette technique,13 Jann (2003) asks a random subset
of a total of 531 survey respondents in Switzerland whether they think that
4,000 CHF/month (approximately US $2,700) is too low or too high for
Mrs. Smith (on an 11-point scale). A randomly chosen second set of survey
respondents rate whether the same income is appropriate for Mr. Smith.
Results indicate that survey respondents think that 4,000 CHF/month is much
too low for Mr. Smith in comparison with Mrs. Smith. Thus, there is still
evidence for gender-specific differences in appropriate pay today.14
4 Norms on appropriate pay and the gender wage gap
Social norms about women’s role on the labor market and shared beliefs about
their appropriate salaries are expected to be important determinants of actual
wages. We study this claim based on our proxy measure for equal rights and
a large data set about individuals’ labor market outcomes. We rely on the
first 13 waves of the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). This rotating panel
survey started in 1991. Interviews are conducted each year in springtime. The
information gathered is primarily used to generate up-to-date information on
the state of the Swiss labor market. Since the SLFS contains information on the
community of residence, we can merge information on the percentage of voters
who approved the equal rights amendment in 1981. In total, there are 2,896
communities (bottom-level political jurisdictions) in Switzerland, ranging in
size from several hundred inhabitants to up to more than 300,000 inhabitants.
12Note that the information about shared local norms is news only for us as statisticians. However,
these norms have been prevalent and at work in these communities for years. What we observe
in outcomes with regard to the gender wage gap (Section 4) and the gender subjective well-being
gap (Section 5) is not the response to the referendum, i.e., it is not a reaction to the referendum in
terms of an information revelation to fellow citizens.
13Jann (2003) applies the same technique as used in the work by Jasso and Webster cited in
Section 2.1.
14Previous research shows that the ratio of the earnings of women relative to men is lowest in
Switzerland in comparison with the USA and six other OECD countries (Blau and Kahn 1992).
The unexplained component of the wage differential is especially high for workers with low
education (Bonjour and Gerfin 2001). Flückiger and Ramirez (2000) analyze the changes in the
wage structure between men and women from 1994 to 1996.
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Fig. 2 Approval of equal rights and wages
The analysis concentrates on all observations with valid information on
income, contractual hours of work, and additional information concerning
human capital and demographic information. This yields a total of 117,878
observations covering 73,526 individuals living in 2,498 different communities.
Figure 2 presents a kernel regression of the log of the hourly rate of pay on
the approval of equal rights.15 There are two striking features in this figure.
First, women’s wages tend to be much lower than men’s wages. Second, there
is a marked increase in the wage rate of women in line with equal rights
being approved. In contrast, the wage rate of men is much less sensitive to the
voting outcome. This is consistent with differences in social work norms being
reflected in labor market outcomes.
Table 1 presents additional descriptive evidence on the relevance of gender-
specific norms regarding the labor market position of women compared to
men. In addition to the log of the hourly rate of pay, we concentrate on three
labor market outcomes: years of schooling, years of actual experience, and
years of tenure with the current employer. Actual experience is defined in the
SLFS as the duration of employment since the last interruption in employment
that lasted longer than 6 months. It is crucial to measure actual experience,
since this human capital input measure reflects more adequately than potential
experience (i.e., age minus time spent in education) the differential attachment
to the labor market between women and men.
15The hourly wage rate is calculated by dividing annual earnings by annual hours. We use a
Gaussian kernel with default bandwidth in kernreg1.ado for STATA. The “blip” in wages for
women and men at 80% voting in favor for equal rights is due to low density of observations at
80% and under-smoothing produced by the default bandwidth.
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The first two columns in Table 1 report gender differences in the weighted
mean of the log of the hourly rate of pay.16 Women who live in communities
with approval rates below average (<60%) earn 30% (= (exp(−0.349) − 1) ×
100) less than men. The corresponding gender wage gap is 24% in communities
with approval of equal rights above average (>60%). Thus, regional differ-
ences in approval of equal rights are correlated statistically and economically
significantly with the gender wage differential. The higher the proportion of
people voting in favor of equal rights in 1981, the lower is the wage gap
between women and men in our sample from 1991 to 2003. Columns 3 to 8
in Table 1 perform a similar analysis for the number of years of schooling,
number of years of work experience, and number of years of tenure. The
idea is that in communities that hold the view that women should earn equal
pay for equal work, women may have stronger incentives to invest in human
capital. The descriptive evidence in Table 1 weakly suggests that women tend
to have a smaller educational disadvantage compared to men in communities
with approval rates exceeding 60%. With respect to work experience, we find
that women have 8 years less actual experience than men in conservative
communities. The corresponding figure in liberal communities is only 6 years.
Interestingly, this result does not originate primarily from higher investment of
women in work experience but also from weaker investment of men in liberal
communities. The last outcome, the number of years of tenure with the current
employer, is studied in columns 7 and 8. We find that women tend to have
shorter tenure representing lower investments in specific human capital than
men and that this disadvantage tends to be much lower in liberal areas than in
conservative areas. In contrast to the results for work experience, we find here
that this effect originates primarily from differences in women’s investments in
specific human capital.
Table 2 performs the same difference-in-differences analysis in a regression
setting. All regressions control for nationality, marital status, part-time status,
canton of residence effects, and time effects. In addition, results for the wage
rate include number of years of schooling, number of years of work experience
(and its square), and number of years of tenure (and its square) as control
variables (see Table 6 in Appendix for results regarding the control variables).
Robust standard errors are reported, adjusted for clustering within commu-
nities. The fraction approving of equal rights is standardized, i.e., demeaned
and divided by the standard deviation. Thus, the coefficient for “female” in
column 1 of Table 2 measures the gender wage differential in the community
with average approval of equal rights (60%), and the coefficient for “approval
of equal rights” gives the change in the log of the hourly rate of pay associated
with an increase by one standard deviation (8%) for men. Results show
that women’s wage rates are 13.8% lower than men’s wages in the average
16We use the inverse of the sampling probability as weights because some waves of the SLFS
tend to oversample specific areas of Switzerland. Weighting effectively ensures that the results are
representative at the national level.
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Table 2 Approval of equal rights and labor market outcomes, Switzerland 1991–2003, partial
correlations
Log (wage rate) Years of schooling Years of actual Years of tenure
experience
Female −0.138 (0.006)b −0.950 (0.039)b −4.828 (0.218)b −2.164 (0.120)b
Approval of 0.035 (0.006)b 0.296 (0.045)b −0.012 (0.163) 0.078 (0.115)
equal rightsa
Female × approval 0.024 (0.006)b 0.008 (0.036) 0.864 (0.175)b 0.392 (0.120)b
of equal rights
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
Observations 117,878 117,878 117,878 117,878
R2 0.30 0.07 0.15 0.09
Weighted (by the inverse of the sampling probability) ordinary least squares estimations. Robust
standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering within communities). Individual character-
istics are: years of schooling, years of actual experience (and its square), years of tenure (and its
square), nationality, martial status, part-time employment status, canton, and time dummies for
results regarding the wage rate. Years of schooling, years of actual experience, and years of tenure
are omitted from the three remaining estimates
Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 1991–2003, own calculations
aThe approval rate of the equal rights amendment is standardized with a mean of zero and
standard deviation equal to one
bSignificant at 1%
community. This is a substantially smaller gender wage gap than the 30%
reported in 1981, first because it narrowed over time and second because we
control for differences in education, experience, and tenure between women
and men. Men’s wage rates increase by 3.5% when the approval of equal
rights increases by one standard deviation.17 This may be due to the fact that
approval of equal rights is low in rural areas (with relatively lower wages) and
high in cities (with relatively higher wages). The interaction term “female ×
approval of equal rights” indicates that the wage rate of women tends to
increase even more than for men in line with approval of equal rights. For
an increase by one standard deviation, the gender wage gap is reduced by
2.4 percentage points. The coefficient is strongly significant in the statistical
sense. More importantly, the result indicates that the mean gender wage gap is
narrowed by as much as one sixth due to an increase of one standard deviation
in the approval of equal pay for equal work.18
This latter result is not driven by differential occupational sorting of women
and men across space. In a first robustness check, detailed year-specific oc-
cupation effects (three-digit occupational classification) are added as control
17This result is conditional on potential regional differences in schooling, work experience, and
tenure.
18Differences in prices across communities do not invalidate this conclusion, since prices are
identical for women and men across communities.
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variables to the basic regression in Table 2 column 1 (not shown).19 Similar
to the baseline regression, we find that a one standard deviation increase in
the approval of equal rights reduces the gender wage gap by about one sixth.
Interestingly, accounting for occupational differences decreases the coefficient
for the partial correlation between the approval of equal rights and the wages
of men (from 3.5% to 1.0%) but increases the extent to which the wage gap
narrows (from 2.4 percentage points to 3.0 percentage points). This result
indicates that there is geographical sorting into occupations that can explain
regional variation in wages. However, there is no evidence for substantive
spatial differences in gender-specific occupational sorting.
The second column in Table 2 reports results for number of years of
schooling. In contrast to the descriptive evidence in Table 1, we do not find
a significant correlation of the gender gap in schooling with the approval of
equal rights. However, for both work experience and tenure with the current
employer, we find a significant and quantitatively important reduction in the
female disadvantage associated with higher approval of equal rights. Results
suggest that up to one sixth or 0.86 years (0.39 years) of the average difference
in work experience (tenure) of 4.83 years (2.16 years) between women and men
disappears due to a one standard deviation increase in the approval of equal
rights. One interpretation of this finding is that liberal views regarding the pay
of women and men are also increasing the incentives to invest in general and
firm-specific human capital.
It is interesting to compare the whole narrowing of the gender wage gap
across regions (when no productivity characteristics are taken into account)
with the extent that the gender wage gap narrows, controlling for human
capital, experience, and tenure. In an unconditional regression of the wage
rate on canton effects and time effects (not shown), we find that the gender
wage gap narrows by 4.9 percentage points due to an increase by one standard
deviation in the share of people approving equal rights. In contrast, the first
column in Table 2 shows that conditional on observed characteristics, the
gender wage gap narrows by 2.4 percentage points due to an increase by one
standard deviation in the approval rate. The total effect is thus about twice as
strong as the conditional effect. This suggests that the social norm that women
should earn as much as men may lead to an indirect increase in the wage rate
(via gender differences in human capital investment) of about the same order
of magnitude as the direct effect of this belief on wages (via gender differences
in bargaining behavior).
Table 3 investigates the sensitivity of our result for wages in six subsamples.
Communities in Switzerland differ with respect to size and population density.
Recent work on monopsony in labor market argues that in rural areas, employ-
ers might have comparably more monopsony power than in areas with higher
density of jobs, like in cities (Manning 2003). The monopsony wage is lower for
groups who react less elastically to wages earned with the current employer. If
19Results not shown in the text are available on request from the authors.
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separation elasticities are lower for women than for men,20 women will earn
less in rural areas than men compared to more densely populated areas.21
Moreover, approval of equal rights is higher in cities than in rural areas.
This suggests that the main result reported in Table 2 might be spurious.
Differences in wage settings with respect to the size of the community instead
of the appropriate pay norm are driving the results. We address this first issue
by performing a separate analysis for communities with a population of less
than 20,000 inhabitants (in 1990) and communities with a population of 20,000
inhabitants or more. First, we find that women’s wages tend to be lower than
men’s wages in both samples by a similar magnitude, the difference amounting
to about.14 log points (columns 1 and 2 in Table 3). Second, in the sample
of large communities, there is a strong and statistically significant increase
in the wages earned by women compared to the wages earned by men in
more liberal communities. This means that the main result reported in Table 2
cannot be rationalized via differences in wage settings across urban and rural
communities.22
The second analysis contrasts cohorts born before 1960, who presumably
voted in 1981, and cohorts born after 1960, who were not allowed to vote in
1981.23 This split in the sample allows studying the inter-generational trans-
mission of social norms. People in the younger cohorts are exposed to norms
that overall emphasize gender equality more than in the past (for a given cross-
sectional variation). Accordingly, we expect that differences in the gender
wage gap are more pronounced among older cohorts than among younger
cohorts.24 In fact, results indicate that for younger cohorts, there are smaller
norm effects than for older cohorts. However, in relation to the gender wage
gap in the average community, the norm effect is of the same relative magni-
tude across cohorts. A one standard deviation increase in the approval of equal
rights is estimated to decrease the gender wage gap by one sixth. This suggests
that social norms regarding appropriate pay for women compared to men are
also relevant in cohorts that have entered the labor market only recently.
20Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) calculate based on gender differences in the elasticity of separations
with respect to the wage earned in the current job that the elasticities of labor supply to the firm
are about 3.5 for men and about 2.7 for women.
21A second argument in favor of contrasting rural areas with cities rests on the presumption that
the fraction of jobs that is tailored entirely to men or women is higher in rural areas than in cities.
22The fact that the interaction term “female × approval of equal rights” is larger for cities than for
relatively small communities may indicate that place of work and place of residence coincides to
a larger extent in the former than in the latter. Moreover, expressed norms in 1981 may be a less
accurate proxy for norms to today in small communities due to differences in migration.
23The minimum age for voting at the national level was 20 in 1981.
24Alternatively, it is likely that individuals, who were relatively old in 1981, are more likely to still
be living in the same community than younger individuals. Thus, the voting proxy for the social
norms regarding the position of women on the labor market may be better for older cohorts than
for younger cohorts. This sample split also allows assessing whether reverse causality is biasing
the results. Young women’s attitudes are not measured in the voting proxy of the social norm. For
young women, the norm measure therefore reflects the norms of the neighborhood that they have
been exposed to.
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The third comparison distinguishes the private service sector from the public
sector (education and public administration).25 Comparing these two sectors is
motivated by the fact that wage bargaining is less common in the public sector
and that the public sector was covered by legislation writing down the equality
of pay between women and men as early as 1977.26 In contrast, it proved to be
very difficult to actually substantiate the claim that equal pay for equal work
was violated in the private service sector.
Results for the private sector indicate that the gender wage gap in the
average community amounts to almost 15% and that the gender wage gap is
lower in communities that have voted more strongly in favor of the equal rights
amendment (column 5 in Table 3). In contrast, the gender wage gap in the
public sector is much smaller (about 6.3%) and this gap is independent of the
approval of equal rights. This result is in line with standardized compensation
rules and legislation equalizing relative pay between women and men across
communities, irrespective of the prevailing social pay norm.27
Our findings provoke some economic follow-up questions and empirical
concerns that we would like to briefly mention. First, one might ask why
do all women not move to liberal areas if differences in outcomes actually
reflect causal effects of social norms on economic well-being. If economic well-
being were all individuals cared about, they probably would. Yet we will study
in the following section to what extent differences in economic well-being
are in line with differences in overall subjective well-being. A second issue
arises with using the voting result as a proxy for the social norm. As argued
earlier, the respective social norms are seen to be internalized, learnt by the
individuals during the formative years at home or at school. This implies that
the voting measure is likely to be a better proxy for internalized norms regard-
ing appropriate pay for individuals who stay in their community compared to
individuals who move during the sample period. Indeed, we find that the wage
gap between women and men narrows slightly more strongly for stayers than
for movers (results not shown). Third, the results for the gender wage gap
could be explained in terms of a closely related norm, namely, that women
should not go for paid work. The women observed on the labor market in
25Note that these results focus on services because the type of work performed by women and men
across service industries is more homogenous than across all industries. Results for the remaining
32,365 observations are similar to the results for the private sector services industries (not shown).
26On October 12, 1977, the Swiss federal court ruled that female teachers in the canton of
Neuchâtel have to be granted the same salary scale as their male colleagues.
27The fact that women are, on average, paid less than men in the public sector suggests that
unmeasured productive characteristics are important. Unfortunately, it is not possible to address
the concern with unmeasured productive characteristics with information on regional mobility
because mobility is endogenous. However, note that sorting of unproductive (relative to women)
men into liberal areas (or vice versa) is at odds with the evidence in Table 3. We find that there
is no correlation of the gender wage gap with voting in industries where appropriate pay norms
are unimportant in affecting pay policies, i.e., public sector service industries. This suggests that
gender differences in unobserved productivity are unlikely to explain the fact that gender wage
gaps are smaller in liberal areas compared to conservative areas.
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more traditional communities are those who are better off working—despite
the social pressure—than staying at home (high disutility of staying at home).
These women are in a weaker bargaining position and end up with a relatively
lower wage. It is not possible to discriminate between the two norm-based ex-
planations from wage regressions alone. However, the alternative explanation
can be addressed based on our data on women’s subjective well-being (in the
next section). Working women are expected to report lower life satisfaction
in more traditional communities than in more liberal communities (because of
the social sanctions and the lower work compensation). Fourth, the questions
arise why firms do not concentrate on hiring women in traditional communities
exploiting the situation and thus whether the empirical finding can reflect an
equilibrium (following the classical reasoning of Becker 1976). We think that
market forces in fact partly wipe out differences in compensation due to social
work norms. However, we also think that there are still “sufficient” market
imperfections that norm effects can put a wedge between productivity and
compensation.
The empirical concerns relate to the inherent problems with cross-section
analyses. First, it is not possible to rule out that unobserved gender differences
in productivity or in the demand of work place amenities are driving our
results. However, an alternative explanation based on these factors is difficult
to align with the differential results for location of residence, cohorts, and
industries. Second, it is possible that local differences in compensation for
reasons that are not related to norms might have affected voting decisions.
Settling this issue of omitted variable bias would require estimations with valid
instruments. So far, we do not see this as a feasible task in the current setting.
Instead, we test whether reported subjective well-being is consistent with
the idea that norms regarding appropriate pay explain gender differences in
compensation.
5 Norms on appropriate pay and subjective well-being
Subjective measures of people’s well-being offer a complementary possibility
for studying the consequences of social norms about the role of women on
the labor market. Traditional economic reasoning would predict that women
who experience a larger gender wage gap also experience relative lower utility
than men. However, if social norms are affecting salaries and the gender wage
gap, women in traditional areas need not feel worse off than women in liberal
areas because women in traditional areas have lower salary expectations to
begin with.
Subjective well-being is captured by measures of reported happiness, sat-
isfaction with life, or satisfaction with particular life domains, like one’s job.
These measures of reported subjective well-being passed a series of validation
exercises and seem to significantly correlate with true positive inner feelings
(see Frey and Stutzer 2002a, b for introductions to the economics of happiness
and references to the validation literature). Based on measures of subjective
952 R. Lalive, A. Stutzer
and psychological well-being, there is substantial research on gender differ-
ences in well-being (for a review, see Nolen-Hoeksema and Rusting 1999).
Recently, striking downward trends in women’s happiness (see Blanchflower
and Oswald 2004 for the USA), women’s life satisfaction (see Stevenson and
Wolfers 2007 for a series of European countries), and women’s job satisfaction
(see Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza 2003 for Great Britain) have been reported
and have—so far—remained unexplained. Here, measures of reported subjec-
tive well-being are taken as a new opportunity for understanding the effect
of social norms on individual welfare in a cross-section setting.28 However, in
future research, the framework could be extended in order to test whether
long-term trends in women’s subjective well-being relate to changes in social
norms. It is important to note that this approach rests upon the assumption
that there is not a norm-dependent response frame when people answer the
question on their satisfaction with life. Otherwise, the observed differences
across communities cannot be interpreted as differences in individual wel-
fare.29 Moreover, measures of subjective well-being allow a direct empirical
analysis of two related issues:
First, in the context of discrimination, it is misleading to only look at the
outcomes in order to make welfare judgments. It is most likely that discrim-
ination per se, i.e., how women are treated, has negative effects on women’s
subjective well-being.30
Second, subjective well-being may be affected by reference standards. Ac-
cording to standard economics, income enters individuals’ utility function in an
absolute sense. Consistent with the important role of standards of appropriate
salaries in negotiation behavior, however, reference standards also affect the
subjective evaluation of labor market outcomes. People judge their situation
relative to their aspirations or some reference standard, and it is the discrep-
ancy between this reference standard and the actual outcome that determines
people’s subjective well-being. In a direct test of this concept of relative
utility, higher income aspirations are related to lower life satisfaction ceteris
paribus (Stutzer 2004).31 Norms prescribing females’ wages to be lower than
28In a previous study, the role of the social norm to live by one’s own earnings in unemployed
people’s life satisfaction has been analyzed. It has been found that the stronger the social norm to
work, the less satisfied unemployed people are with their life (Stutzer and Lalive 2004).
29Instead, we would observe what Kahneman (2000) called a “satisfaction treadmill”: people
report constant well-being even though their “true” individual welfare increases with a higher
material living standard (here, a lower gender wage gap). However, if in more liberal communities
women’s aspirations increase, their “improved” circumstances need not to translate into higher
“true” individual welfare as women experience a “hedonic treadmill effect.” However, we do not
think that differences in the response frame hide working women’s suffering due to discrimination
in more traditional communities, as we see consistent patterns of evidence across four measures.
30This can be understood as procedural disutility (see Frey et al. 2004 for the concept of procedural
utility) that affects women’s well-being beyond narrow economic outcomes such as wages.
31In a study of 5,000 British workers, Clark and Oswald (1996) formed the reference income as
the average income of persons with the same labor market characteristics. They conclude that the
higher the income of the reference group, the less satisfied people are with their job.
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men’s wages can thus be expected to positively affect women’s subjective well-
being because their lower salary standards reduce the gap between expected
and actual income (Clark 1997). This mechanism could explain the finding
mentioned in Section 1 that in most countries, women do not report lower
subjective well-being than men despite gender wage gaps persisting.
We approach the question using a second data set: the Swiss Household
Panel (SHP). We use the first three available waves from 1999 to 2001 as
our testing strategy is for a cross-section design. The SHP is a representative
survey for Switzerland and contains roughly 7,000 individual observations
per wave from roughly 1,000 different communities. In addition to standard
socioeconomic characteristics, it includes a question about job satisfaction in
1999, a question about satisfaction with life in the years 2000 and 2001, as
well as questions about perceived general and individual penalization by the
opposite sex in the years 2000 and 2001. The concrete question wording is as
follows:
– In general, how satisfied are you with your life if 0 means “not at all
satisfied” and 10 means “completely satisfied”?
– On a scale from 0 “not at all satisfied” to 10 “completely satisfied” can you
indicate your degree of satisfaction with your job generally?
– Do you have the feeling that in Switzerland women are penalized com-
pared with men in certain areas, if 0 means “not at all penalized” and 10
“strongly penalized”?
– Do you, in your everyday life, feel penalized compared with the opposite
sex, if 0 means “not at all penalized” and 10 “strongly penalized”?
Answers to these questions are merged with data on the approval of equal
rights at the community level.
We assess the possible correlations between our proxy measure for social
norms about women’s role on the labor market and their subjective well-
being in two steps. In a descriptive analysis (presented in Table 4), raw
correlations are assessed. They include potentially important correlated varia-
tion in individual socio-demographic characteristics, such as education. Partial
correlations are shown in Table 5.
We first discuss the results for reported satisfaction with life based on a
sample of salaried women and men. Descriptive statistics indicate that there
is no significant difference in life satisfaction between women and men in
communities where a large number of the citizens approved the equal rights
amendment (approval rate >60%). In contrast, women working in the labor
market are significantly more satisfied with their lives than men in conservative
communities (approval rate <60%). This results in a negative difference-in-
differences estimation for being a woman and living in a high approval rather
than in a low approval community. In Table 5, these findings are replicated in a
multiple regression controlling for a large number of individual characteristics
(the full estimation results are presented in Table 7 in Appendix). Robust
standard errors are reported adjusted for clustering within communities. Like
in the previous subsection, the variable measuring the approval of equal rights
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Table 5 Approval of equal rights and women’s subjective well-being, Switzerland 1999–2001,
partial correlations
Satisfaction Job satisfaction Feeling that women Feeling personally
with life are penalized penalized
(compared to men) (compared to the
opposite sex)
Female 0.161 (0.047)b 0.157 (0.077)c 0.422 (0.096)b 1.774 (0.093)b
Approval of equal −0.002 (0.032) −0.066 (0.048) 0.055 (0.058) −0.051 (0.034)
rightsa
Female × approval −0.100 (0.037)b −0.055 (0.059) 0.134 (0.078)d 0.213 (0.075)b
of equal rights
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
Observations 6,203 3,383 6,149 6,114
R2 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.16
Ordinary least squares estimations. Sample is restricted to salaried workers. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering within communities)
Source: Swiss Household Panel, own calculations
aThe approval rate of the equal rights amendment is standardized with a mean of zero and
standard deviation equal to one
bSignificant at 1%
cSignificant at 5%
dSignificant at 10%
is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation 1. It is important to
note that a respondent’s earned income is not included in the estimation
function. In order to test whether the variation in the gender wage gap is
due to discrimination, the empirical strategy requires to test whether women
in communities where they, on average, have lower wages also report lower
individual well-being. As lower wages are the theoretically supposed channel
through which discrimination works, we have to exclude this variable from the
regression. If own labor income were controlled for, the partial correlation
between our proxy for the social norm and reported life satisfaction could no
longer serve as a test for the discrimination hypothesis.32
Results show that employed women, on average, are more satisfied than
men, reporting a 0.16 higher score of subjective well-being than employed men.
This gender effect is measured at the sample mean of the variable capturing
social pay norms. The coefficient for “approval of equal rights” indicates that
salaried men are equally satisfied with their life across communities, indepen-
dent of differences in the social norms for the role of women on the labor
market. However, as captured by the interaction term “female × approval
of equal rights,” employed women are statistically significantly less satisfied
32According to the reasoning in the previous section, there are further variables that can be
considered endogenous to the norm like education and other household members’ income. If these
variables are excluded, still a negative partial correlation for the interaction term is estimated (not
shown).
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with their life in communities where a larger percentage of the population
approved equal rights. If the approval rate is increased from one standard
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, average
life satisfaction is reduced by 0.20 units on the ten-point scale. This is a
large negative effect, equivalent to having an incomplete compulsory school
education rather than having served an apprenticeship, or equal to one seventh
of the negative effect of unemployment on life satisfaction.33
This result runs contrary to an interpretation of the wage results in the pre-
vious section in terms of perceived discrimination in traditional communities.
Before we provide possible interpretations of the findings for the gender
wage gap and the life satisfaction gap in more and less liberal communities,
we present additional results for women’s and men’s subjective evaluation of
their living situation. As in previous studies, we find higher job satisfaction for
women than for men (coefficient for “female” = 0.16). However, we have too
small a sample to be able to statistically precisely estimate a partial correlation
between the approval of equal rights and regional variation in job satisfaction.
So far, a negative coefficient for the interaction variable is estimated.
Tables 4 and 5 include two questions about people’s perception of gender
discrimination. Contrary to the evidence about the gender wage gap, which
is smaller in communities where equal rights have been broadly approved
than where there was a lot of opposition, women feel more penalized in more
liberal communities than in traditional communities. This result is found in
the descriptive statistics as well as in the partial correlations. Moreover, the
questions are posed whether people think that women are penalized generally,
as well as personally, compared to the opposite sex. Not surprisingly, for both
measures, women report higher ratings of being penalized.34
A useful unifying framework to understand our results is gender identity
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Gender is one of the most important social
categories. There exist strong gender-specific behavioral prescriptions. As we
argue in this paper, an important one is for women to be cooperative, selfless,
and modest. On the labor market, this is reflected in lower appropriate wages
and reluctance in wage bargaining. Accordingly, utility not only reflects one’s
own outcomes (i.e., income) but also identity—that is, the extent to which
individuals conform to the behavioral prescription of their gender. The identity
framework makes predictions that are different from the standard framework
in at least two important respects. First, women and men behave differently; in
our context, women ask for lower wages than men. Second, gender differences
in outcomes need not reflect gender differences in utility.
33Estimation results including the partial correlation between unemployment and life satisfaction
are based on an extended sample of the SHP and can be obtained from the authors on request.
34Our results are in line with existing research on the relationship between gender wage gaps and
perceived discrimination. Specifically, several authors find that those women reporting the most
gender discrimination face, in fact, the least statistical discrimination (Kuhn 1987; Barbezat and
Hughes 1990; Antecol and Kuhn 2000).
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In this paper, we provide evidence that (1) prescriptions about women’s
behavior on the labor market differ across space, (2) outcomes vary according
to gender prescriptions—gender wage differences are lower in areas favoring
prescriptions for equal pay, and (3) self-reported subjective well-being not only
depends on outcomes but also on prescriptions for equal pay. These results
are in line with a framework stressing gender identity as the source of gender
differences in outcomes and seemingly conflicting gender differences in well-
being.35
There are, of course, alternative explanations to the negative correlation
between the approval of equal rights and women’s satisfaction with life.
First, there is the possibility of an omitted variable bias, i.e., a third variable
correlated with the measure for the social norm affects the life satisfaction of
women and men, but differently. Second, the lower wages of women in more
traditional communities could be more than compensated by the higher wages
of their husbands. In the main estimation, the partial correlation for the social
norm effect (relative to men) is measured for a given income contributed by
the partner. In order to exclude this compensatory channel and to measure
the net effect for women, the variable capturing other household members’
income is dropped in an additional estimation. For this specification, still
a negative partial correlation for the interaction term is found. However,
consistent with the compensation hypothesis, the coefficient is slightly smaller
in absolute terms (not shown). Third, there could be some selection effect that
leads happy women in traditional communities to go for paid work, while the
unhappy women stay at home. However, an empirical test looking at the partial
correlation between the measure for the social norm and the subjective well-
being of women who are not in salaried employment is not consistent with this
explanation (results not shown). Fourth, women in liberal communities might
just be the precursors of a movement that tries to change traditional norms
about women’s restricted role on the labor market. This “revolt” may have
some gains in terms of higher salaries, but might result in even higher costs due
to the social sanctions by traditional women and men. Moreover, it might well
be that equality at the work place has developed substantially in more liberal
communities, as reflected by the lower gender wage gap. However, working
women may still have to carry most of the burden of doing the housework.
6 Concluding remarks
It is well known that women earn less than men. However, women are not
less satisfied with their jobs or with their lives than men. This paper argues
that the extent to which women and men believe that a woman’s appropriate
35Another test of the gender identity hypothesis based on data on reported subjective well-being
is by Booth and van Ours (2008). They relate intra-family patterns in working hours to spouses’
life satisfaction.
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salary is equal to a man’s salary may be important in understanding this puzzle.
Historically, women and men tended to specialize in different areas of life, with
men being responsible for the family income and women being responsible for
the well-being of the family.
This paper captures the extent to which such gender-specific norms still
apply today with the voting outcome regarding an equal rights amendment
to the Swiss constitution in 1981. The approval rate for the equal rights
amendment, prescribing “equal pay for equal work,” varies very strongly
across communities. Thus, it is possible to assess the relevance of gender-
specific pay norms for the relative success of women and men on the labor
market by linking the gender wage gap measured for the years 1991–2003
to the voting outcome. Results indicate that the mean gender wage gap is
narrowed by as much as one sixth due to an increase of one standard deviation
in the approval of equal rights. Moreover, there is no corresponding effect
in the public sector, which applies standardized compensation rules and was
covered by non-discriminatory legislation as early as 1977.
As wage differences may not capture the full extent to which women’s lives
are affected by gender-specific pay norms and prescriptions about appropriate
behavior on the labor market, we study self-reported subjective well-being for
2000/2001. Results indicate that in contrast to an explanation based on per-
ceived discrimination, women in conservative areas (with strong disapproval
of equal rights and a large gender wage gap) are more (not less) satisfied with
their life than men. There is no corresponding difference between women and
men in liberal areas. This result reinforces the interpretation based on gender-
specific identity and internalized norms regarding appropriate pay for women
compared to men.
Based on the evidence, we conclude that social norms regarding appropriate
pay for women and men are the main explanatory factor of current gender
differences in economic well-being. This explanation implies that changing the
outcomes for women will take a long time. While our study offers an important
first step towards understanding the overall implications of gender pay norms,
we believe that future work should address exactly how norms and institutions
interact and thus study the dynamics in social norm changes. Primarily, we shall
address how anti-discrimination law affects women’s behavior and well-being,
given their varying liberal views, and how their actual beliefs are affected.
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Appendix
Table 6 Approval of equal rights and wages, Switzerland 1999–2003, dependent variable: log
(hourly wage rate)
Female −0.138 (0.006)∗∗∗
Approval of equal rightsa 0.035 (0.006)∗∗∗
Female × approval of equal rights 0.024 (0.006)∗∗∗
Schooling (in years) 0.070 (0.002)∗∗∗
Work experience (in years) 0.024 (0.001)∗∗∗
Work experience squared/100 −0.040 (0.002)∗∗∗
Tenure (in years) 0.012 (0.001)∗∗∗
Tenure squared/100 −0.020 (0.002)∗∗∗
Non-Swiss −0.098 (0.007)∗∗∗
Married 0.080 (0.006)∗∗∗
Part-time −0.043 (0.008)∗∗∗
Canton effects Yes
Year effects Yes
Observations 117,878
R2 0.30
Results are not shown for year dummies, dummies indicating that work income or the level of
education is not known and dummies for interview language. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering within communities are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%
Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey, own calculations
aThe approval rate of the equal rights amendment is standardized with a mean of zero and
standard deviation equal to one
Table 7 Approval of equal rights and life satisfaction, Switzerland 2000–2001, dependent variable:
satisfaction with life
OLS Ordered probit
Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE
Female 0.161 0.048 0.142 0.037
Approval of equal rightsa −0.002 0.032 −0.003 0.025
Female × approval of equal rights −0.100 0.037 −0.074 0.028
Age −0.078 0.014 −0.065 0.011
Age squ./100 0.094 0.016 0.079 0.013
Compulsory schooling Reference group
Incomplete compulsory schooling −0.096 0.661 0.123 0.411
Apprenticeship 0.121 0.081 0.056 0.060
Maturity/high school 0.179 0.090 0.093 0.069
Vocational high school 0.244 0.094 0.139 0.074
University of applied sciences 0.264 0.111 0.147 0.086
University 0.265 0.088 0.152 0.067
Single Reference group
Married 0.334 0.069 0.273 0.056
Separated −0.654 0.223 −0.384 0.142
Divorced −0.191 0.106 −0.110 0.080
Widowed 0.001 0.200 −0.003 0.169
National Reference group
Foreigner −0.367 0.067 −0.264 0.051
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Table 7 (continued)
OLS Ordered probit
Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE
Full-time employment Reference group
Part-time employment −0.081 0.059 −0.061 0.044
Household income contributed 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.004
by other household members
Household size, square root 0.035 0.063 0.027 0.051
Constant 9.240 0.276
Number of observations 6203 6203
R2/pseudo-R2 0.06 0.02
Results are not shown for year dummy, dummies indicating that work income or the level of
education is not known and dummies for interview language
Source: Swiss Household Panel, own calculations
aThe approval rate of the equal rights amendment is standardized with a mean of zero and
standard deviation equal to one
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